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ABSTRACT
Releasing full data records is one of the most challenging
problems in data privacy. On the one hand, many of the
popular techniques such as data de-identification are prob-
lematic because of their dependence on the background knowl-
edge of adversaries. On the other hand, rigorous methods
such as the exponential mechanism for differential privacy
are often computationally impractical to use for releasing
high dimensional data or cannot preserve high utility of orig-
inal data due to their extensive data perturbation.
This paper presents a criterion called plausible deniability
that provides a formal privacy guarantee, notably for releas-
ing sensitive datasets: an output record can be released only
if a certain amount of input records are indistinguishable, up
to a privacy parameter. This notion does not depend on the
background knowledge of an adversary. Also, it can effi-
ciently be checked by privacy tests. We present mechanisms
to generate synthetic datasets with similar statistical prop-
erties to the input data and the same format. We study
this technique both theoretically and experimentally. A key
theoretical result shows that, with proper randomization,
the plausible deniability mechanism generates differentially
private synthetic data. We demonstrate the efficiency of
this generative technique on a large dataset; it is shown to
preserve the utility of original data with respect to various
statistical analysis and machine learning measures.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is tremendous interest in releasing datasets for re-
search and development. Privacy policies of data holders,
however, prevent them from sharing their sensitive datasets.
This is due, to a large extent, to multiple failed attempts of
releasing datasets using imperfect privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms such as de-identification. A range of inference attacks
on, for example, AOL search log dataset [2], Netflix movie
rating dataset [39], Genomic data [48, 21], location data [17,
46], and social networks data [40], shows that simple modifi-
cation of sensitive data by removing identifiers or by general-
izing/suppressing data features results in major information
leakage and cannot guarantee meaningful privacy for data
owners. These simple de-identification solutions, however,
preserve data utility as they impose minimal perturbation
to real data.
Rigorous privacy definitions, such as differential privacy
[14], can theoretically guarantee privacy and bound informa-
tion leakage about sensitive data. However, known mecha-
nisms, such as the Laplacian mechanism [14] or the exponen-
tial mechanism [37], that achieve differential privacy through
randomization, have practical limitations. The majority of
scenarios, where they have been applied, are limited to in-
teractive count queries on statistical databases [13]. In a
non-interactive setting for releasing generic datasets, these
mechanisms are either computationally infeasible on high-
dimensional data, or practically ineffective because of their
large utility costs [25]. At best, these methods are used to
release some privacy-preserving statistics (e.g., histograms
[5, 51]) about a dataset, but not full data records. It is not
obvious how to protect the privacy of full records as opposed
to that of aggregate statistics (by adding random noise).
Despite all these obstacles, releasing full data records is
firmly pursued by large-scale data holders such as the U.S.
Census Bureau [20, 27, 26]. The purpose of this endeavor is
to allow researchers to develop analytic techniques by pro-
cessing full synthetic data records rather than a limited set
of statistics. Synthetic data could also be used for edu-
cational purpose, application development for data analy-
sis, sharing sensitive data among different departments in
a company, developing and testing pattern recognition and
machine learning models, and algorithm design for sensitive
data. There exists some inference-based techniques to assess
the privacy risks of releasing synthetic data [42, 43]. How-
ever, the major open problem is how to generate synthetic
full data records with provable privacy, that experimentally
can achieve acceptable utility in various statistical analytics
and machine learning settings.
In this paper, we fill this major gap in data privacy by
proposing a generic theoretical framework for generating
synthetic data in a privacy-preserving manner. The funda-
mental difference between our approach and that of existing
mechanisms for differential privacy (e.g., exponential mecha-
nism) is that we disentangle the data generative model from
privacy definitions. Instead of forcing a generative model to
be privacy-preserving by design, which might significantly
degrade its utility, we can use a utility-preserving generative
model and release only a subset of its output that satisfies
our privacy requirements. Thus, for designing a generative
model, we rely on the state-of-the-art techniques from data
science independently from the privacy requirements. This
enables us to generate high utility synthetic data.
We formalize the notion of plausible deniability for data
privacy [3], and generalize it to any type of data. Consider
a probabilistic generative model that transforms a real data
record, as its seed, into a synthetic data record. We can
sample many synthetic data records from each seed using
such a generative model. According to our definition, a syn-
thetic record provides plausible deniability if there exists a
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set of real data records that could have generated the same
synthetic data with (more or less) the same probability by
which it was generated from its own seed. We design a
privacy mechanism that provably guarantees plausible deni-
ability. This mechanism results in input indistinguishability :
by observing the output set (i.e., synthetics), an adversary
cannot tell for sure whether a particular data record was in
the input set (i.e., real data). The degree of this indistin-
guishability is a parameter in our mechanism.
Plausible deniability is a property of the overall process,
and similar to differential privacy, it is independent of any
adversary’s background knowledge. In fact, we prove that
our proposed plausible deniable data synthesis process can
also satisfy differential privacy, if we randomize the indis-
tinguishability parameter in the privacy mechanism. This
is a significant theoretical result towards achieving strong
privacy using privacy-agnostic utility-preserving generative
models. Thus, we achieve differential privacy without ar-
tificially downgrading the utility of the synthesized data
through output perturbation.
The process of generating a single synthetic data record
and testing its plausible deniability can be done indepen-
dently from that of other data records. Thus, millions of
data records can be generated and processed in parallel.
This makes our framework extremely efficient and allows
implementing it at a large scale. In this paper, we develop
our theoretical framework as an open-source tool, and run
it on a large dataset: the American Community Survey [47]
from the U.S. Census Bureau which contains over 3.1 million
records. In fact, we can generate over one million privacy-
preserving synthetic records in less than one hour on a multi-
core machine running 12 processes in parallel.
We analyze the utility of synthetic data in two major sce-
narios: extracting statistics for data analysis, and perform-
ing prediction using machine learning. We show that our
privacy test does not impose high utility cost. We also
demonstrate that a significant fraction of candidate syn-
thetic records proposed by a generative model can pass the
privacy test even for strict privacy parameters.
We show that a strong adversary cannot distinguish a
synthetic record from a real one with better than 63.0% ac-
curacy (baseline: 79.8%). Furthermore, when it comes to
classification tasks, the accuracy of the model learned on a
synthetic dataset is only slightly lower than that of model
trained on real data. For example, for Random Forest the
accuracy is 75.3% compared to 80.4% when trained on real
data (baseline: 63.8%); whereas for AdaBoostM1 the ac-
curacy is 78.1% compared to 79.3% when trained on real
data (baseline: 69.2%). Similar results are obtained when
we compare logistic regression (LR) and support vector ma-
chine (SVM) classifiers trained on our synthetic datasets
with the same classifiers trained (on real data) in a differ-
ential private way (using state-of-the-art techniques). Con-
cretely, the accuracy of classifiers trained on our synthetic
data is 77.5% (LR) and 77.1% (SVM); compared to 76.3%
(LR) and 78.2% (SVM) for objective-perturbation ε-DP clas-
sifiers.
Contributions. We introduce a formal framework for plau-
sible deniability as a privacy definition. We also design a
mechanism to achieve it for the case of generating synthetic
data. We prove that using a randomized test in our plausible
deniability mechanism achieves differential privacy (which
is a stronger guarantee). We also show how to construct
generative models with differential privacy guarantees. The
composition of our generative model and plausible deniabil-
ity mechanism also satisfies differential privacy. We show
the high accuracy of our model and utility of our generated
synthetic data. We develop a generic tool and show its high
efficiency for generating millions of full data records.
2. PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY
In this section, we formalize plausible deniability as a
new privacy notion for releasing privacy-preserving synthetic
data. We also present a mechanism to achieve it. Finally, we
prove that our mechanism can also satisfy differential pri-
vacy (which is a stronger guarantee) by slightly randomizing
our plausible deniability mechanism.
Informally, plausible deniability states that an adversary
(with any background knowledge) cannot deduce that a par-
ticular record in the input (real) dataset was significantly
more responsible for an observed output (synthetic record)
than was a collection of other input records. A mecha-
nism ensures plausible deniability if, for a privacy parameter
k > 0, there are at least k input records that could have gen-
erated the observed output with similar probability.
Unlike the majority of existing approaches (e.g., to achieve
differential privacy), designing a mechanism to satisfy plau-
sible deniability for generative models does not require adding
artificial noise to the generated data. Instead, we separate
the process of releasing privacy-preserving data into run-
ning two independent modules: (1) generative models, and
(2) privacy test. The first consists in constructing a utility-
preserving generative data model. This is ultimately a data
science task which requires insight into the type of data for
which one wants to generate synthetics. By contrast, the pri-
vacy test aims to safeguard the privacy of those individuals
whose data records are in the input dataset. Every gener-
ated synthetic is subjected to this privacy test; if it passes
the test it can be safely released, otherwise it is discarded.
This is where the plausible deniability criterion comes into
the frame: the privacy test is designed to ensure that any
released output can be plausibly denied.
In this section, we assume a generic generative model that,
given a data record in the input dataset as seed, produces
a synthetic data record. In Section 3, we present a generic
generative model based on statistical models, and show how
it can be constructed in a differentially-private manner, so
that it does not significantly leak about its own training
data. Plausibly deniable mechanisms protect the privacy of
the seeds, and are not concerned about how the generative
models are constructed.
LetM be a probabilistic generative model that given any
data record d can generate synthetic records y with proba-
bility Pr{y =M(d)}. Let k ≥ 1 be an integer and γ ≥ 1 be
a real number. Both k and γ are privacy parameters.
Definition 1 (Plausible Deniability).
For any dataset D with |D| ≥ k, and any record y gener-
ated by a probabilistic generative model M such that y =
M(d1) for d1 ∈ D, we state that y is releasable with (k, γ)-
plausible deniability, if there exist at least k − 1 distinct
records d2, ..., dk ∈ D \ {d1} such that
γ−1 ≤
Pr{y =M(di)}
Pr{y =M(dj)}
≤ γ, (1)
for any i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
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The larger privacy parameter k is, the larger the indistin-
guishability set for the input data record. Also, the closer
to 1 privacy parameter γ is, the stronger the indistinguisha-
bility of the input record among other plausible records.
Given a generative model M, and a dataset D, we need
a mechanism F to guarantee that the privacy criterion is
satisfied for any released data. Specifically F produces data
records by usingM on dataset D. The following mechanism
enforces (k, γ)-plausible deniability by construction.
Mechanism 1 (F with Plausible Deniability).
Given a generative model M, dataset D, and parameters k,
γ, output a synthetic record y or nothing.
1. Randomly sample a seed record d ∈ D.
2. Generate a candidate synthetic record y =M(d).
3. Invoke the privacy test on (M, D, d, y, k, γ).
4. If the tuple passes the test, then release y.
Otherwise, there is no output.
The core of Mechanism 1 (F) is a privacy test that simply
rejects a candidate synthetic data record if it does not satisfy
a given privacy criterion.
We can think of Definition 1 as a privacy criterion that
can be efficiently checked and enforced. So, instead of try-
ing to measure how sensitive the modelM is with respect to
input data records, we test if there are enough indistinguish-
able records in the input dataset that could have (plausibly)
generated a candidate synthetic data record.
Privacy Test 1 (Deterministic test T ).
Given a generative model M, dataset D, data records d and
y, and privacy parameters k and γ, output pass to allow
releasing y, otherwise output fail.
1. Let i ≥ 0 be the (only) integer that fits the inequalities
γ−i−1 < Pr{y =M(d)} ≤ γ−i .
2. Let k′ be the number of records da ∈ D such that
γ−i−1 < Pr{y =M(da)} ≤ γ
−i .
3. If k′ ≥ k then return pass, otherwise return fail.
Step 2 counts the number of plausible seeds, i.e., records
in D which could have plausibly produced y. Note that for
a given y, there may exist some records da ∈ D such that
Pr{y =M(da)} = 0. Such records cannot be plausible seeds
of y since no integer i ≥ 0 fits the inequalities.
Remark that Privacy Test 1 (T ) enforces a stringent con-
dition that the probability of generating a candidate syn-
thetic y given the seed d and the probability of generating
the same record given another plausible seed da both fall
into a geometric range [γ−i−1, γ−i], for some integer i ≥ 0,
assuming γ > 1. Notice that, under this test, the set of
k − 1 different das plus d satisfies the plausible deniability
condition (1).
Informally, the threshold k prevents releasing the implau-
sible synthetics records y. As k increases the number of
plausible records which could have produced y also increases.
Thus, an adversary with only partial knowledge of the input
dataset cannot readily determine whether a particular input
record d was the seed of any released record y. This is be-
cause there are at least k−1 other records di 6= d in the input
dataset which could plausibly have been the seed. However,
whether y passes the privacy test itself reveals something
about the number of plausible seeds, which could poten-
tially reveal whether a particular d is included in the input
data. This can be prevented by using a privacy test which
randomizes the threshold k (as Section 2.1 shows) in which
case the mechanism achieves (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
2.1 Relationship with Differential Privacy
We show a connection between Plausible Deniability and
Differential Privacy, given the following definition.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy [15]).
Mechanism F satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any
neighboring datasets D, D′, and any output S ⊆ Range(F ):
Pr{F (D′) ∈ S} ≤ eεPr{F (D) ∈ S}+ δ .
Typically, one chooses δ smaller than an inverse polynomial
in the size of the dataset, e.g., δ ≤ |D|−c, for some c > 1.
In this section, we prove that if the privacy test is ran-
domized in a certain way, then Mechanism 1 (F) is in fact
(ε, δ)-differentially private for some δ > 0 and ε > 0. Pri-
vacy Test 1 simply counts the number of plausible seeds for
an output and only releases a candidate synthetic if that
number is at least k. We design Privacy Test 2 which is
identical except that it randomizes the threshold k.
Privacy Test 2 (Randomized test Tǫ0).
Given a generative model M, dataset D, data records d and
y, privacy parameters k and γ, and randomness parameter
ǫ0, output pass to allow releasing y, otherwise output fail.
1. Randomize k by adding fresh noise: k˜ = k + Lap( 1
ǫ0
).
2. Let i ≥ 0 be the (only) integer that fits the inequalities
γ−i−1 < Pr{y =M(d)} ≤ γ−i .
3. Let k′ be the number of records da ∈ D such that
γ−i−1 < Pr{y =M(da)} ≤ γ
−i .
4. If k′ ≥ k˜ then return pass, otherwise return fail.
Here z ∼ Lap(b) is a sample from the Laplace distribution
1
2b
exp (−|z|
b
) with mean 0 and shape parameter b > 0.
Theorem 1 (Differential Privacy of F).
Let F denote Mechanism 1 with the (randomized) Privacy
Test 2 and parameters k ≥ 1, γ > 1, and ε0 > 0. For any
neighboring datasets D and D′ such that |D|, |D′| ≥ k, any
set of outcomes Y ⊆ U, and any integer 1 ≤ t < k, we have:
Pr{F(D′) ∈ Y } ≤ eεPr{F(D) ∈ Y }+ δ ,
for δ = e−ε0(k−t) and ε = ε0 + ln (1 +
γ
t
).
The privacy level offered by Theorem 1 is meaningful pro-
vided k is such that δ is sufficiently small. For example, if we
want δ ≤ 1
nc
for some c > 1, then we can set k ≥ t+ c
ε0
lnn.
Here t provides a trade-off between δ and ε.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix C.
Roughly speaking, the theorem says that, except with some
small probability δ, adding a record to a dataset cannot
change the probability that any synthetic record y is pro-
duced by more than a small multiplicative factor. The in-
tuition behind this is the following.
Fix an arbitrary synthetic record y produced by the mech-
anism on some dataset. Remark that given y, records are
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partitioned into disjoint sets according to their probabili-
ties of generating y (with respect to M). That is, parti-
tion i for i = 0, 1, 2 . . ., contains those records d such that
γ−(i+1) < Pr{y = M(d)} ≤ γ−i. (We ignore records which
have probability 0 of generating y.)
Now suppose we add an arbitrary record d′ to the dataset.
The probability of producing y changes in two ways: (1) the
probability that y is generated increases because d′ may be
chosen as seed, and (2) the probability that y passes the pri-
vacy test increases because d′ is an additional plausible seed.
Remark that this change only impacts whichever partition
d′ falls into because the probability of passing the privacy
test depends only on the number of plausible seeds in the
partition of the seed.
Thus, we focus on the partition in which d′ falls. If that
partition contains a small number of records compared to k
then introducing d′ could increase the probability of generat-
ing y significantly, but the probability of passing the privacy
test is very small. (The likelihood of passing the privacy test
decreases exponentially the fewer plausible seeds are avail-
able compared to k.) In contrast, if the partition contains a
number of records comparable to k or larger, then the prob-
ability of generating y increases only slightly (because there
are already a large number of plausible seeds with similar
probability of generating y as d′). And, the probability of
passing the privacy test increases by a multiplicative factor
of at most eε0 due to adding Laplacian noise. In both cases,
the increase to the probability of producing y due to adding
d′ is small and can be bounded.
3. GENERATIVE MODEL
In this section, we present our generative model, and the
process of using it to generate synthetic data. The core of
our synthesizer is a probabilistic model that captures the
joint distribution of attributes. We learn this model from
training data samples drawn from our real dataset D. Thus,
the model itself needs to be privacy-preserving with respect
to its training set. We show how to achieve this with differ-
ential privacy guarantees.
Let DS, DT, and DP be three non-overlapping subsets of
dataset D. We use these datasets in the process of synthesis,
structure learning, and parameter learning, respectively.
3.1 Model
Let {x1,x2, ...,xm} be the set of random variables asso-
ciated with the attributes of the data records in D. Let G
be a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where the nodes are the
random variables, and the edges represent the probabilis-
tic dependency between them. A directed edge from xj to
xi indicates the probabilistic dependence of attribute i to
attribute j. Let PG(i) be the set of parents of random vari-
able i according to the dependency graph G. The following
model, which we use in Section 3.2 to generate synthetic
data, represents the joint probability of data attributes.
Pr{x1, ...,xm} =
m∏
i=1
Pr{xi | {xj}∀j∈PG(i)} (2)
This model is based on a structure between random vari-
ables, captured by G, and a set of parameters that construct
the conditional probabilities. In Section 3.3 and Section 3.4,
we present our differentially-private algorithms to learn the
structure and parameters of the model from D, respectively.
3.2 Synthesis
Using a generative model, we probabilistically transform
a real data record (called the seed) into a synthetic data
record, by updating its attributes. Let {x1, x2, ..., xm} be
the values for the set of data attributes for a randomly se-
lected record in the seed dataset DS. Let ω be the number
of attributes for which we generate new values. Thus, we
keep (i.e., copy over) the values of m − ω attributes from
the seed to the synthetic data. Let σ be a permutation over
{1, 2, ..., m} to determine the re-sampling order of attributes.
We set the re-sampling order σ to be the dependency or-
der between random variables. More precisely, ∀j ∈ PG(i):
σ(j) < σ(i). We fix the values of the first m− ω attributes
according to σ (i.e., the synthetic record and the seed overlap
on their {σ(1), ..., σ(m− ω)} attributes). We then generate
a new value for each of the remaining ω attributes, using
the conditional probabilities (2). As we update the record
while we re-sample, each new value can depend on attributes
with updated values as well as the ones with original (seed)
values.
We re-sample attribute σ(i), for i > m− ω, as
x′σ(i) ∼ Pr{xσ(i) | {xσ(j) = xσ(j)}∀j∈PG(i),j≤m−ω,
{xσ(j) = x
′
σ(j)}∀j∈PG(i),j>m−ω} (3)
In Section 2, we show how to protect the privacy of the
seed data record using our plausible deniability mechanisms.
Baseline: Marginal Synthesis. As a baseline generative
model, we consider a synthesizer that (independently from
any seed record) samples a value for an attribute from its
marginal distribution. Thus, for all attribute i, we generate
xi ∼ Pr{xi}. This is based on an assumption of indepen-
dence between attributes’ random variables, i.e., it assumes
Pr{x1, ...,xm} =
∏m
i=1 Pr{xi}.
3.3 Privacy-Preserving Structure Learning
Our generative model depends on the dependency struc-
ture between random variables that represent data attributes.
The dependency graph G embodies this structure. In this
section, we present an algorithm that learns G from real
data, in a privacy-preserving manner such that G does not
significantly depend on individual data records.
The algorithm is based on maximizing a scoring function
that reflects how correlated the attributes are according to
the data. There are multiple approaches to this problem
in the literature [35]. We use a method based on a well-
studied machine learning problem: feature selection. For
each attribute, the goal is to find the best set of features
(among all attributes) to predict it, and add them as the
attribute’s parents, under the condition that the dependency
graph remains acyclic.
The machine learning literature proposes several ways to
rank features in terms of how well they can predict a particu-
lar attribute. One possibility is to calculate the information
gain of each feature with the target attribute. The major
downside with this approach is that it ignores the redun-
dancy in information between the features. We propose to
use a different approach, namely Correlation-based Feature
Selection (CFS) [19] which consists in determining the best
subset of predictive features according to some correlation
measure. This is an optimization problem to select a sub-
set of features that have high correlation with the target
attribute and at the same time have low correlation among
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themselves. The task is to find the best subset of features
which maximizes a merit score that captures our objective.
We follow [19] to compute the merit score for a parent set
PG(i) for attribute i as
score(PG(i)) =
∑
j∈PG(i)
corr(xi,xj)√
|PG(i)|+
∑
j,k∈PG(i)
corr(xj ,xk)
, (4)
where |PG(i)| is the size of the parent set, and corr() is
the correlation between two random variables associated
with two attributes. The numerator rewards correlation be-
tween parent attributes and the target attribute, and the
denominator penalizes the inner-correlation among parent
attributes. The suggested correlation metric in [19], which
we use, is the symmetrical uncertainty coefficient:
corr(xi,xj) = 2− 2
H(xi,xj)
H(xi) + H(xj)
, (5)
where H() is the entropy function.
The optimization objective in constructing G is to max-
imize the total score(PG(i)) for all attributes i. Unfortu-
nately, the number of possible solutions to search for is ex-
ponential in the number of attributes, making it impractical
to find the optimal solution. The greedy algorithm, sug-
gested in [19], is to start with an empty parent set for a
target attribute and always add the attribute (feature) that
maximizes the score.
There are two constraints in our optimization problem.
First, the resulting dependency graph obtained from the set
of best predictive features (i.e., parent attributes) for all
attributes should be acyclic. This would allow us to decom-
pose and compute the joint distribution over attributes as
represented in (2).
Second, we enforce a maximum allowable complexity cost
for the set of parents for each attribute. The cost is pro-
portional to the number of possible joint value assignments
(configurations) for the parent attributes. So, for each at-
tribute i, the complexity cost constraint is
cost(PG(i)) =
∏
j∈PG(i)
|xj | ≤ maxcost (6)
where |xj | is the total number of possible values that the at-
tribute j takes. This constraint prevents selecting too many
parent attribute combinations for predicting an attribute.
The larger the joint cardinality of attribute i’s parents is,
the fewer data points to estimate the conditional probability
Pr{xi | {xj}∀j∈PG(i)} can be found. This would cause over-
fitting the conditional probabilities on the data, that results
in low confidence parameter estimation in Section 3.4. The
constraint prevents this.
To compute the score and cost functions, we discretize the
parent attributes. Let bkt() be a discretizing function that
partitions an attribute’s values into buckets. If the attribute
is continuous, it becomes discrete, and if it is already dis-
crete, bkt() might reduce the number of its bins. Thus, we
update conditional probabilities as follows.
Pr{xi | {xj}∀j∈PG (i)} ≈ Pr{xi | {bkt(xj)}∀j∈PG (i)} (7)
where the discretization, of course, varies for each attribute.
We update (4) and (6) according to (7). This approxima-
tion itself decreases the cost complexity of a parent set, and
further prevents overfitting on the data.
3.3.1 Differential-Privacy Protection
In this section, we show how to safeguard the privacy of
individuals whose records are in D, and could influence the
model structure (which might leak about their data).
All the computations required for structured learning are
reduced to computing the correlation metric (5) from D.
Thus, we can achieve differential privacy [15] for the struc-
ture learning by simply adding appropriate noise to the met-
ric. As, the correlation metric is based on the entropy of a
single or a pair of random variables, we only need to compute
the entropy functions in a differentially-private way. We also
need to make sure that the correlation metric remains in the
[0, 1] range, after using noisy entropy values.
Let H˜(z) be the noisy version of the entropy of a ran-
dom variable z, where in our case, z could be a single or
pair of random variables associated with the attributes and
their discretized version (as presented in (7)). To be able
to compute differentially-private correlation metric in all
cases, we need to compute noisy entropy H˜(xi), H˜(bkt(xi)),
H˜(xi,xj), and H˜(xi,bkt(xj)), for all attributes i and j. For
each of these cases, we generate a fresh noise drawn from
the Laplacian distribution and compute the differentially-
private entropy as
H˜(z) = H(z) + Lap(
∆H
εH
) (8)
where ∆H is the sensitivity of the entropy function, and εH
is the differential privacy parameter.
It can be shown that if z is a random variable with a prob-
ability distribution, estimated from nT = |DT| data records,
then the upper bound for the entropy sensitivity is
∆H ≤
1
nT
[2 +
1
ln(2)
+ 2 log2 nT ] = O(
log2 nT
nT
) (9)
The proof of (9) can be found in Appendix B. Remark that
∆H is a function of nT (the number of records in DT) which
per se needs to be protected. As a defense, we compute ∆H
in a differentially-private manner, by once randomizing the
number of records
n˜T = nT + Lap(
1
εnT
) (10)
By using the randomized entropy values, according to (8),
the model structure, which will be denoted by G˜, is dif-
ferentially private. In Section 3.5, we use the composition
theorems to analyze the total privacy of our algorithm for
obtaining a differentially-private structure.
3.4 Privacy-Preserving Parameter Learning
Having a dependency structure G˜, we need to compute the
conditional probabilities for predicting each of the attributes
given its parent set (see (2)). This is a well-known problem
in statistics. In this section, we show how to learn the pa-
rameters that represent such conditional probabilities, from
DP, in a differentially private manner.
The problem to be solved is to first learn a prior distribu-
tion over the parameters of the conditional probabilities. To
do so, we learn the hyper-parameters (the parameters of the
prior distribution over the model’s parameters) from data.
Only then, we can compute the parameters that form the
conditional probabilities from the prior distribution.
Let us take the example of computing the parameters for
predicting discrete/categorical attributes. In this case, we
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assume a multinomial distribution over the attribute’s val-
ues (that fall into different bins). The conjugate prior for
multinomials comes from a Dirichlet family. The Dirichlet
distribution assigns probabilities to all possible multinomial
distributions, according to the statistics obtained from a set
of data records.
Let |xi| be the number of distinct values that attribute i
can take. The probability of some multinomial distribution
parameters ~p ci = p
c
i,1, p
c
i,2, ..., p
c
i,|xi|
to predict attribute i,
under configuration c for PG(i), is
Pr{~p ci | G˜,DP} = Dir(~α
c
i + ~n
c
i ) (11)
where ~α ci is the vector of default hyper-parameters for the
Dirichlet distribution, and ~n ci is the vector for the number of
data records in DP with PG˜(i) configuration c with different
values for attribute i (i.e., element n ci,l is the number of
records for which xi = l and PG˜(i) configuration is c). The
Dirichlet distribution is computed as
Dir(~α ci + ~n
c
i ) =
m∏
i=1
#c∏
c=1
Γ(αci + n
c
i )
|xi|∏
l=1
(pci )
αci,l+n
c
i,l−1
Γ(αci,l + n
c
i,l)
(12)
where αci =
∑
l
αci,l, and n
c
i =
∑
l
nci,l, and the number of
configurations #c is
∏
j∈P
G˜
(i) |bkt(xj)|, which according to
constraint (6) can at most be maxcost.
Learning the parameters of the model, in the case of a
Dirichlet prior for multinomial distribution, is simply com-
puting ~n ci from the data records in DP. Given the proba-
bility distribution (11) over the multinomial parameters, we
can compute the most likely set of parameters as
pci,l =
αci,l + n
c
i,l
αci + n
c
i
(13)
or, we can sample a set of multinomial parameters according
to (12). This is what we do in our generative model, in order
to increase the variety of data samples that we can generate.
Note that for computing the marginal distributions, that
are needed for the baseline, we perform the same computa-
tions by setting the parent sets to be empty.
If an attribute is continuous, we can learn the parameters
of a Normal distribution or learn a regression model from
our data to construct its conditional probability. We omit
the details here (as in the dataset we evaluate in Section 6
all attributes are discrete).
3.4.1 Differential-Privacy Protection
The parameters of the conditional probabilities depend on
the data records in DP, thus they can leak sensitive informa-
tion about individuals who contributed to the real dataset.
In this section, we show how to learn parameters of the
attribute conditional probabilities (i.e., ~p ci values) with dif-
ferential privacy guarantees.
Note that in (11), the only computations that are depen-
dent on DP are the ~n
c
i counts (for all c and i). To find
the variance of the noise to be added to these counts, to
achieve differential privacy, we need to compute their sensi-
tivity with respect to one individual’s data record.
Suppose we are computing the parameters associated with
predicting a given attribute i given its parent set PG˜(i). Note
that adding a record to DP increases exactly a single com-
ponent nci,l, for which it matches value l for attribute i and
configuration c for its parent set. So, only one single element
among all #c×|xi| elements of ~ni = ~n
1
i , ~n
2
i , ..., ~n
#c
i changes.
This implies that the L1 sensitivity of ~ni is 1. Consequently,
a random noise drawn from Lap( 1
εp
) can be added to each
component of ~ni independently. More precisely, for any at-
tribute i value l, and configuration c, we randomize counts
as
n˜ci,l = max(0, n
c
i,l + Lap(
1
εp
)) (14)
and use them to compute (11) with differential privacy.
3.5 Differential Privacy Analysis
In this section, we compute the differential privacy level
that we can guarantee for the whole dataset D for learning
the structure and the parameters of the model. We com-
pute the total (ǫ, δ) privacy by composing the differentially-
private mechanisms in Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.4.1.
Remark that we often protect the output f(x) of some
function f by adding noise from Lap(
∆f
ε
), where ∆f is the
L1 sensitivity of f . This mechanism is known as the Laplace
mechanism and it satisfies ε-differential privacy (Theorem
3.6 of [15]).
Thus them(m+1) entropy values, H˜(z), needed for struc-
ture learning (Section 3.3.1) are obtained in an a way that
satisfies εH-differential privacy. This is also the case for the
number of records nT , i.e., it satisfies εnT -differential pri-
vacy. Similarly, the counts nci,l parameters learned for each
configuration (Section 3.4.1) satisfy εp-differential privacy.
For structure learning, we make use of both sequential
composition (Theorem 2) and advanced composition (The-
orem 3). Specifically, we use advanced composition for the
m(m + 1) entropy values and sequential composition with
the number of records. That is, the overall privacy achieved
(of structure learning) is (εL, δL)-differential privacy for a
fixed δL ≪ 1nT and εL = εnT + εH
√
2m(m+ 1) ln (δ−1L ) +
m(m+ 1)εH(e
εH − 1).
For the parameter learning (as explain in Section 3.4.1),
for a given attribute i, the L1 sensitivity of all configura-
tions of the parent set of i, i.e., PG˜(i), is 1. The overall pri-
vacy achieved (of parameter learning) is (εP , δP )-differential
privacy using advanced composition over the m attributes.
Here, δP ≪ 1np (where np is the number of records in DP)
and εP = εp
√
2m ln (δ−1P ) +mεp(e
εp − 1).
Given that DT and DP are non-overlapping, the privacy
obtained for the generative model is differentially private
with parameters (max{εL, εP},max{δL, δP }). Due to ran-
dom subsampling of DT and DP from D, the privacy param-
eters can be further improved by using the amplification
effect of sampling (Theorem 4) to obtain (ε, δ)-differential
privacy.
4. DATA
For validation, we use the 2013 American Community Sur-
vey (ACS) [47] from the U.S. Census Bureau. The dataset
contains upwards of 3 million of individual records. Each
record includes a variety of demographics attributes such as
age, sex, race, as well as attributes related to the individual’s
income such as yearly income in USD.
The ACS dataset has been used for various purposes rang-
ing from examining the relationship between education and
earnings [23] to looking at current language use patterns
of children of immigrants [38]. Furthermore, the prominent
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Table 1: Pre-processed ACS13 dataset attributes.
Name Type Cardinality (Values)
Age (AGEP) Numerical 80 (17 to 96)
Workclass (COW) Categorical 8
Education (SCHL) Categorical 24
Martial Status (MAR) Categorical 5
Occupation (OCCP) Categorical 25
Relationship (RELP) Categorical 18
Race (RAC1P) Categorical 5
Sex (SEX) Categorical 2 (male or female)
Hours Worked per Week (WKHP) Numerical 100 (0 to 99+)
World Area of Birth (WAOB) Categorical 8
Income Class (WAGP) Categorical 2 (≤ 50K, > 50K)[USD]
Table 2: ACS13 data extraction and cleaning statistics.
Records 3, 132, 796 (clean: 1, 494, 974)
Attributes 11 (numerical: 2, categorical: 9)
Possible Records 540, 587, 520, 000 (≈ 239)
Unique Records 1, 022, 718 (68.4%)
Classification Task Income class
UCI Adult dataset, which provides a well-established bench-
mark for machine learning tasks, was extracted from the
1994 Census database. The 2013 ACS dataset contains sim-
ilar attributes so we process it in a manner similar to how
the Adult dataset was extracted. In particular, we extract
the same attributes whenever possible.
As pre-processing, we discard records with missing or in-
valid values for the considered attributes (Table 1). Table 2
shows some statistics of the data cleaning and extracted
dataset. This is a highly dimensional dataset despite hav-
ing only 11 attributes, there are more than half a trillion
possible records and out of the roughly 1.5 million records
obtained after cleaning, approximately 2/3 are unique.
We bucketize (Section 3.3) values of the age attribute in
bins (i.e., buckets) of 10, i.e., 17 to 26, 27 to 36, etc. (Fol-
lowing the rules used to extract the Adult dataset, we only
consider individuals older than 16.) We also bucketize the
values of: hours worked per week (HPW), in bins of 15
hours; education, to aggregate education level below a high-
school diploma in a single bin, and high-school diploma but
not college into (another) single-bin. Bucketization is per-
formed based on the data format and the semantics of at-
tributes (and thus is privacy-preserving). It is done only for
structured learning (Section 3.3); both the input and output
data format remain the same.
5. SYNTHETICS GENERATOR TOOL
The synthetic generator [4] is implemented as C++ tool
which takes as input: a dataset represented as a CSV file, a
few metadata text files describing the dataset, and a config
file. As output, the tool produces a synthetic dataset of the
requested size and some metadata.
The generation process is defined by the config file, i.e.,
parameters defined within in control various aspects of the
generation process. The parameters are the privacy pa-
rameters k, γ, ε0, and also parameters of the generative
model such as ω. In addition, the tool takes two optional
parameters to control the privacy test: max plausible and
max check plausible, which allow the test to terminate early.
Specifically, the implementation initially sets k′ = 0, and
iterates over the records of D in a random order, incre-
menting k′ for each plausible seed record da encountered.
The process terminates whenever k′ ≥ max plausible or if
max check plausible records have been examined (whichever
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Figure 1: Relative Improvement of Model Accuracy of
the un-noised, ε = 1-DP, and ε = 0.1-DP models, with re-
spect to the baseline (marginals). Overall, the improve-
ment for ε = 1 or ε = 0.1 is comparable to that for the
un-noised version. Adding noise to achieve DP for struc-
ture learning (Section 3.3) can lead to a different acyclic
graph of the model. (This is why there is a significant dif-
ference in improvement for attributes RACE and WAOB
between ε = 1-DP and ε = 0.1-DP.)
occurs first). Note that this affects performance (but not
privacy); lower values lead to faster generation time in cases
where plausible seeds are abundant, at the cost of fewer syn-
thetics passing the test (potentially lowering utility).
The synthesis process, given a chosen seed, is independent
of other seeds (Section 2); so the generation process itself is
embarrassingly parallel. One hurdle with running multiple
concurrent instances is implementing differentially-private
parameters learning (Section 3.4.1). In general, the number
of configuration (in the sense of Section 3.4) of the model is
too large (i.e., exponential in the number of attributes) to
learn the model as a pre-processing step. So we design the
tool to learn the model for each configuration as it encoun-
ters it. To ensure that the privacy guarantee holds we set
the RNG seed number to be a deterministic function (i.e., a
hash) of the configuration.
6. EVALUATION
We feed the 2013 ACS dataset (Section 4) as input to our
tool and generate millions of synthetic records. We start
with a description of the experimental setup. The evalua-
tion itself is divided into four logical parts: (Section 6.2) sta-
tistical measures (how good are the synthetics according to
well-established statistical metrics); (Section 6.3) machine
learning measures (how good are the synthetics for machine
learning tasks, specifically classification); (Section 6.4) dis-
tinguishing game (how successful is an adversary at distin-
guishing between a real record and a synthetic one); and
(Section 6.5) performance measures (how computationally
complex it is to generate synthetics).
6.1 Setup
To achieve differential privacy we sampled the input dataset
into disjoint sets of records. Each of DT and DP contains
roughly 280, 000 records, whereas DS contains roughly 735, 000
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Figure 2: Model Accuracy. The difference between the
random forest accuracy and the marginals accuracy indi-
cates how informative the data is about each attribute.
records (Section 3.5). For differential privacy of the gener-
ative model, we set ε = 1 (though we give some results for
ε = 0.1) and always set δ to be at most 2−30 ≈ 10−9.
We typically compare the quality of our generated syn-
thetics with real records (coming from the input dataset)
and privacy-preserving marginals (Section 3.2) which we re-
fer to as reals andmarginals, respectively. The synthetics we
generate are referred by their generation parameters (e.g.,
ω = 10). Unless otherwise stated, we set k = 50, ε0 = 1,
γ = 4, and ω is set to vary between 5 and 11.
We maintain a testing set of roughly 100, 000 records.
Evaluation of classifiers (in this section) uses at least 100, 000
records for training and a (disjoint) testing set of size at least
30% of the size of the aforementioned training set.
6.2 Statistical Measures
We evaluate the quality of the synthetics in terms of their
statistical utility, i.e., the extent to which they preserve the
statistical properties of the original (input) dataset. We can
do this at the level of the generative model (Section 3.1)
itself. Concretely, we directly quantify the error of the
privacy-preserving generative model before any synthetic
record is generated. We do this for each attribute by repeat-
edly selecting a record from the input dataset (uniformly at
random) and using the generative model to find the most
likely attribute value (of that attribute) given the other at-
tributes. The generative model error is then measured as the
proportion of times that the most likely attribute value is
not the correct (i.e., original) one. We repeat this procedure
millions of times to quantify the average error of the model
for each attribute. Because the generative model is made
differentially private by adding noise (Section 3.4.1) we ad-
ditionally repeat the whole procedure 20 times (learning a
different private model each time) and take the average.
The results are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows
the relative decrease in model error (i.e., improvement of
model accuracy) over the (privacy-preserving) marginals; it
shows this improvement for the un-noised, (ε=1)-differential
private, and (ε=0.1)-differential private generative models.
There is a clear accuracy improvement over marginals, in
addition to a low decrease in improvement between the un-
noised model and the ε=1 and ε=0.1 noisy versions.
Figure 2 shows the accuracy of the un-noised generative
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Figure 3: Statistical Distance for individual attributes
of two distributions: reals and (other) reals; reals and
marginals; reals and synthetics (for varying ω). The
smaller the statistical distance the more information is
preserved. The distance of reals and ω = 11 and ω = 10
synthetics is similar to that of reals and marginals.
model against the (un-noised) marginals, random guessing
(baseline), and the best classifier we could find (trained on
as many records as the generative model), the random forest
(RF). While RF’s accuracy is sometimes higher than that of
the generative model, the accuracy of the latter is in many
cases significantly higher than that of marginals and random
guessing. We conclude that while the proposed generative
model does not perform as well as RF (though making RF
differentially private would certainly lower its performance)
it does perform significantly better than marginals (or ran-
dom guessing).
In addition to the error of the generative model, we can
more directly evaluate the extent to which the generated
synthetics preserve the statistical properties of the original
(input) dataset. To do this, we compare the probability
distributions of the synthetics with the reals and marginals.
Specifically, for reals, marginals and synthetics datasets, we
compute the distribution of each attribute and of each pair of
attributes. We compare each of these distributions to those
computed on (other) reals and quantify their distance. We
use a well-established statistical distance metric called “the”
statistical distance (a.k.a. total variation distance [16, 29]).
The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4, where Figure 3
shows box-and-whisker plots for the distance of the distri-
butions of each attribute separately, and Figure 4 shows
box-and-whisker plots for the distance of the distributions
of all pairs of attributes. While marginals do well for single
attribute and sometimes outperform our synthetics (though
the statistical distance for all datasets is small), synthet-
ics clearly outperform marginals for pairs of attributes. We
conclude that the generated synthetics preserve significantly
more statistical information than marginals.
6.3 Machine Learning Measures
In addition to preserving statistical properties of the orig-
inal (input) dataset, the synthetics should also be suitable
to various machine learning tasks. In particular, given a
learning task, we can evaluate the extent to which synthet-
ics are suitable replacements for a real dataset. For the ACS
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Figure 4: Statistical Distance for pairs of attributes
of two distributions: reals and (other) reals; reals and
marginals; reals and synthetics (for varying ω). The
smaller the statistical distance the more information is
preserved. The distance of reals and synthetics is signif-
icantly smaller than that of reals and marginals.
dataset, a natural and well-establish classification task is to
predict a person’s income class (i.e., ≥ 50K or < 50K) using
the other attributes as features (Section 4).
We train various classifiers on the synthetic datasets and
on the real (input) dataset. We then compare: the classi-
fication accuracy obtained, and the agreement rate of the
learned classifiers. Specifically, for two classifiers trained on
different datasets (but with the same classification task), we
define the agreement rate to be the percentage of records
for which the two classifiers make the same prediction (re-
gardless of whether the prediction is correct). Given that we
look at the agreement rate of classifiers trained on reals and
synthetics, the agreement rate reveals the extent to which
the classifier trained on synthetic data has learned the same
model as the classifier trained on real data.
Table 3 shows the obtained results for three (best) classi-
fiers: Classification Tree (Tree), Random Forest (RF), and
AdaBoostM1 (Ada). The accuracy and agreement rate are
calculated as the average over 5 independent runs, that is,
for each run, we use different (randomly sampled) training
and testing datasets. Overall, we see that both the accuracy
and the agreement rates of the synthetics are significantly
closer to that of the reals than the marginals are.
In addition to comparing the best classifiers trained on
real data versus those trained on synthetic data, we can also
compare privacy-preserving classifiers trained on real data
versus non-private classifiers trained on (privacy-preserving)
synthetic data. In particular, Chaudhuri et al. [9] propose
two techniques based on empirical risk minimization to train
logistic regression (LR) and support vector machines (SVM)
binary classifiers: output perturbation (noise is added to the
learned model), and objective perturbation (noise is added
to the objective function of the minimization problem). To
train such classifiers, we first pre-process our datasets fol-
lowing the instructions in [9]: we transform each categorical
attribute into an equivalent set of binary attributes, and nor-
malize features so that each feature takes values in [0, 1] and
subsequently further normalize each training example such
that its norm is at most 1. The target attribute for clas-
Table 3: Classifier Comparisons. The agreement rate
is the proportion of times that the classifier makes the
same prediction as a classifier trained on real data.
Accuracy Agreement Rate
Tree RF Ada Tree RF Ada
Reals 77.8% 80.4% 79.3% 80.2% 86.4% 92.4%
Marginals 57.9% 63.8% 69.2% 58.5% 65.4% 75.6%
ω = 11 72.4% 75.3% 78.0% 73.9% 79.0% 83.0%
ω = 10 72.3% 75.2% 78.1% 73.8% 78.9% 83.6%
ω = 9 72.4% 75.2% 77.5% 73.9% 79.2% 82.4%
ω ∈R [9− 11] 72.3% 75.2% 78.1% 73.7% 79.0% 83.9%
ω ∈R [5− 11] 72.1% 75.2% 78.1% 73.6% 79.2% 83.3%
Table 4: Privacy-Preserving Classifier Comparisons.
LR SVM
Non Private 79.9% 78.5%
Output Perturbation 69.7% 76.2%
Objective Perturbation 76.3% 78.2%
Marginals 68.9% 68.9%
ω = 11 77.6% 77.2%
ω = 10 77.7% 77.1%
ω = 9 77.5% 77.1%
ω ∈R [9− 11] 77.5% 76.9%
ω ∈R [5− 11] 77.7% 77.3%
sification is again the person’s income class. The method
proposed in [9] has two parameters: the privacy budget ε
which we set to 1 (the same as for our generative model),
and λ which is a regularization parameter. We use the code
of [9], which we obtain courtesy of the authors, to train the
LR and SVM classifiers. Because the classification mod-
els vary greatly depending on λ, we vary its value in the set
{10−3, 10−4, 10−5, 10−6} and (optimistically) pick whichever
value maximizes the accuracy of the non-private classifica-
tion model.
We report the accuracy obtained in each case in Table 4,
where we contrast non-private, output perturbation DP, and
objective perturbation DP classifiers trained on real data
with non-private classifiers trained on our synthetic datasets
(for various values of ω). Remark that for the case ω = 11,
for example, this is a fair comparison as the obtained LR
and SVM classifiers are ε = 1-DP and thus provides the ex-
act same privacy guarantee as the output perturbation and
objective perturbation LR and SVM classifiers. Non-private
LR and SVM classifiers trained on our (privacy-preserving)
synthetic datasets are competitive with differentially private
LR and SVM classifiers trained on real data.
We emphasize that the results should be interpreted in
favor of our proposed framework. Indeed, the classifiers
trained on our privacy-preserving synthetics outperforms ε-
DP LR classifier and only achieves about 1% lower accuracy
than the objective-perturbation ε-DP SVM. This is signifi-
cant because the technique to train the ε-DP LR and SVM
is specifically optimized for that task. In contrast, our syn-
thetics are not specifically generated to optimize any par-
ticular classification task; instead the general objective is to
preserve the statistical properties of real data.
6.4 Distinguishing Game
A different way to evaluate the quality of synthetic datasets
is to quantify the extent to which the synthetics can “pass
off” as real records. In other words, we can imagine a game
in which the participant is given a random record either
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Table 5: Distinguishing Game. Random Forest (RF)
and Classification Tree (Tree) can easily distinguish
marginals from reals but perform significantly less well
when trying to distinguish synthetics from reals.
Reals Marginals
ω = or ∈R
11 10 9 [9− 11] [5− 11]
RF 50% 79.8% 62.3% 61.8% 63.0% 60.1% 61.4%
Tree 50% 73.2% 58.9% 58.6% 59.8% 57.9% 58.4%
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Figure 5: Synthetic Generation Performance. The pa-
rameters are: ω = 9, k = 50, γ = 4. The time to generate
10, 000 synthetic records on a single-core is less than 10
minutes. Thus, in the same time frame we can generate
1 million records with 100 parallel instances.
from a real dataset or a synthetic dataset (but doesn’t know
which) and is asked to distinguish between the two possi-
bilities. In this case, the utility is measured by how likely
a sophisticated participant (e.g., a well-established learning
algorithm) is to make a mistake, i.e., confuse a synthetic
record with a real record or vice-versa.
For our purpose the role of the participant is played by
the two best classifiers (those that best distinguish synthet-
ics from reals): Random Forest (RF) and Classification Tree
(Tree). Specifically, we provide 50, 000 records from both
a real dataset and a synthetic dataset (i.e., 100, 000 total)
as training examples to the (binary) classifier. We then
evaluate the accuracy on a 50% mix of real and synthetic
records which were not part the training set. Table 5 shows
the results: both classifiers obtain reasonably high (79.8%
and 73.2%) accuracy in distinguishing marginals from real
records. However, both classifiers obtain much lower accu-
racy (i.e., 63%) when trying to distinguish synthetics from
reals.
6.5 Performance Measures
In addition to how much utility they preserve, synthetics
also need to be easy to generate. The generation is a parallel
process, so we measure the time taken for both the learning
of the privacy-preserving generative model (model learning)
and the synthetics generation (synthesis) itself. Figure 5
shows the time taken to produce various number of syn-
thetics records (totaling over 1 million). The parameters
max plausible and max check plausible (Section 5) were
set to 100 and 50000 respectively. The machine used for the
experiment runs Scientific Linux and is equipped with an
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Figure 6: Percentage of candidates which pass the pri-
vacy test for various values of k and ω (γ = 2). The
percentage decreases for higher privacy (i.e., larger k)
but remains significant even for combinations of param-
eters yielding high privacy. The conclusion is that (very)
large synthetic datasets can efficiently be generated.
Intel Xeon E5-2670 processor (2.60GHz) with 32 processing
units and 128GB of RAM. We ran 96 instances (16 in par-
allel at a time) and picked a random maximum runtime for
each instance between 3 and 15 minutes.
The generator outputs all synthetics produced regardless
of whether they pass the privacy test. Naturally, only those
which pass the test should to be released. Thus, the ex-
tent to which we can synthesize large (privacy-preserving)
datasets depends on how easy it is to find synthetics that
pass the privacy-test (Section 2). To evaluate this, we set
γ = 2 and max check plausible = 100, 000, and vary k and
ω. We measure the proportion of synthetics which pass the
privacy test. The results are shown in Figure 6: even for
stringent privacy parameters (e.g., k = 100) a significant
proportion (i.e., over 50% for ω ∈R [5 − 11]) of synthetics
pass the test.
7. RELATED WORK
Data synthesis is the process of creating artificial data
that can be used to serve some key purposes of real data.
For example, it can be used to test software [50, 41] when
there is an inadequate supply of real tests available from
operations. It can be used to evaluate the performance of
database systems [18] when obtaining real data at sufficient
scale is difficult or expensive. It can also be used to protect
privacy. In 1993, Rubin [44] proposed the idea of creat-
ing synthetic data based on multiple imputation, that is, on
repeated use of a function that proposes values for missing
fields in a record. The generative model we presented in Sec-
tion 3.1 uses a similar technique. This and related work have
given rise to a substantial body of research on the release of
synthetic data [24, 12]. Such techniques have achieved sig-
nificant deployment; for example, they have been adopted
by the U.S. Census Bureau [20, 27].
An alternative to data synthesis sometimes called syn-
tactic privacy protection transforms the sensitive data us-
ing a combination of aggregation, suppression, and gener-
alization, to achieve criteria such as k-anonymity [45] or l-
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diversity [34]. Although these techniques support privacy
protected data publishing without synthesis, the degree of
privacy protection they provide depends on the background
knowledge of adversaries. The key difference between (k, γ)-
plausible deniability and k-anonymity is that the latter is a
syntactic condition on the output of a sanitization process,
whereas plausible deniability is a condition on a synthetic
generator mechanism with respect to its input data.
Plausible deniability as a privacy notion for synthetic data
was proposed by Bindschaedler and Shokri in [3] which de-
scribes a technique to synthesize location trajectories in a
privacy-preserving way. The use of plausible deniability
in [3] is specific to location privacy as it is defined in terms
of a semantic distance between two location trajectories. In
contrast, this work generalizes the notion of plausible de-
niability for general data synthesis by establishing it as a
privacy criterion in terms of the underlying synthesis prob-
abilities. Consequently, this criterion is applicable to any
system and any (kind of) data. The generative framework
described in this paper enables us to formally connect plau-
sible deniability to differential privacy (Theorem 1).
Differential privacy provides guarantees even against ad-
versaries with (almost) unlimited background knowledge.
However, popular differentially private mechanisms such as
the Laplacian mechanism target the release of aggregate
statistics. By contrast, we focus on synthesizing data with
the same format as the (sensitive) input data. Preserving
the data format is valuable for many reasons, such as en-
abling the use of applications and code that are targeted at
raw or sanitized data. There is a line of work on mecha-
nisms that are differentially private and provide data as an
output. Some of these techniques have theoretical properties
that may make them impractical in important cases [6].
A prominent example is the Exponential Mechanism [37].
Informally, the mechanism induces a distribution on the
space of output records by assigning a weight to each such
record and then producing output records by sampling from
that distribution. The mechanism is of great importance for
algorithm design due to its generality. However, as several
researchers have pointed out [11, 28, 5], a direct application
is too costly to be practical for high-dimensional datasets
due to the complexity of sampling, which grows exponen-
tially in the dimension of the data records. Concretely, a
straightforward implementation of the exponential mecha-
nism to generate synthetic records from the ACS dataset
(Section 4) would sample from a universe of records of size
roughly 239 (Table 2). This would require pre-computing
that many probabilities. If we assume we can store each
value in four bytes this would require about 2TB of mem-
ory. In contrast, the complexity of synthesizing a record
with our framework depends only on the number of records
in the dataset and on the complexity of our generative model
and thus the process is very efficient in practice (Section 6.5).
There is a growing collection of mechanisms and case stud-
ies for differentially private release of data [1, 8, 36, 33, 49,
10, 22], although some of these are based on a broad view
of data release, such as the release of histograms or con-
tingency tables. Our use of plausible deniability to achieve
differentially private data adds to this body of work. The
typical approach to protect privacy in this context is to add
noise directly to the generative model. For example, this
is the approach taken by [30, 7, 32, 52]. In particular, [52]
constructs a generative model based on Bayesian networks
similar to the generic generative model of Section 3.
Our work takes a novel approach: instead of trying to
achieve differential privacy directly, we design the generative
framework to achieve plausible deniability. A major step
towards achieving plausible deniability and a key novelty is
the idea of testing privacy. That is, instead of designing the
mechanism so it achieves that notion by design, we use a pri-
vacy test which rejects “bad” samples. As a side effect, the
generative model is decoupled from the framework. Privacy
is guaranteed in a way that is oblivious to the specifics of
the generative model used for synthesis. Furthermore, the
guarantee offered by our proposed (k, γ)-plausibly deniable
mechanism is surprisingly close to that of differential pri-
vacy, as evidenced by the fact that merely randomizing the
threshold yields a differentially private mechanism.
The idea of running data synthesis and then testing pri-
vacy has been used before. For example, Reiter et al. in [42]
and [43] use inference to evaluate privacy risk for a synthetic
data release. However, there is no proof of privacy, and it is
not efficient to run a set of inference attacks to estimate the
risk before releasing a dataset.
8. DISCUSSION
Regardless of whether one intends to release a set of ag-
gregate statistics or a synthetic dataset, there is no privacy
protection technique that can preserve utility for all mean-
ingful utility functions. However, one key feature of our
generative framework is that, unlike other approaches based
on differential privacy, any generative modelM can be used
while keeping the same privacy guarantees. As a result, de-
signing M is a data science problem which need not involve
considerations of the privacy of the seeds.
Parameter ω (Section 3) controls the closeness of synthet-
ics to their seeds. (Lower ω means more dependence on
the seed but it is harder to pass the privacy test.) A prag-
matic approach is to generate synthetics for various values
of ω and then randomly sample a subset of those synthetics
which pass the privacy test (this is evaluated in Section 6).
Note that no matter what the value of ω is, the privacy of
the seeds is ensured because of the privacy test.
In the special case where the generative model M is in-
dependent of the seed, the privacy guarantee applies to any
output from Mechanism 1 because the privacy test always
passes. However, for a seed-dependent generative model,
the privacy of the seeds is safeguarded by rejecting synthet-
ics which do not pass the privacy test. So, when generating
several synthetics using the same input dataset, the privacy
obtained depends on the number of synthetics released. In
fact, when Privacy Test 2 is used, the (ε, δ)-differential pri-
vacy guarantee applies to a single (released) synthetic record
y. That said, the composition theorems for differential pri-
vacy can be used to extend the guarantee to arbitrarily large
synthetic datasets, provided the privacy budget is appro-
priately increased. We leave as future work the design of
improved composition strategies.
9. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the first practical data synthesis tool
with strong privacy guarantees. We have formalized plausi-
ble deniability for generating generic data records, and have
proven that our mechanisms can achieve differential privacy
without significantly sacrificing data utility.
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APPENDIX
A. COMPOSING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Theorem 2 (Sequential Composition – 3.16 [15]).
Let Fi be an (εi, δi)-differentially private mechanism, for
i = 1, . . . ,m. Then, for any dataset D, the mechanism
which releases outputs: (F1(D),F2(D), . . . ,Fm(D)) is an
(ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism for ε =
∑m
i=1 εi, and
δ =
∑m
i=1 δi.
Theorem 3 (Advanced Composition – 3.20 [15]).
Let Fi be an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism, for i =
1, . . . ,m. Then the mechanism represented by the sequence
of k queries over F1(·),F2(·), . . . ,Fm(·) with potentially dif-
ferent inputs is (ε′, δ′)-differentially private for:
ε′ = ε
√
2k ln
1
δ′′
+ kε(eε − 1) and δ′ = kδ + δ′′ .
Theorem 4 (Amplification of Sampling – [31]).
Let mechanism F be an (ε, δ)-differentially private mecha-
nism. The mechanism which first sub-samples each record
of its input dataset with probability δ < p < 1 and then runs
F on the sub-sampled dataset is (ε′, δ′)-differentially private
for:
ε′ = ln (1 + p(eε − 1)) and δ′ = pδ .
B. PROOF: SENSITIVITY OF ENTROPY
Lemma 1 (Sensitivity of H).
Let z be a discrete random variable with a probability dis-
tribution estimated from n data records. The sensitivity of
H(z) is:
∆H ≤
1
n
[2 +
1
ln(2)
+ 2 log2 n] .
Lemma 1 is used in Section 3.3.1 (9).
Proof. Let z and z′ be the random variables associated
with two histograms (of dimension m) computed from two
neighboring datasets D and D′, respectively. Both datasets
have n records but differ in exactly one record.
Let zc = (c1, c2, . . . , cm) and z
′
c = (c
′
1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
m) repre-
sent the histograms over the m values of the attribute for
z and z′, respectively. The entropy is computed over the
probability distribution represented by a histogram.
Remark that the histograms of the considered neighboring
datasets D and D′ can only differ in two positions. If they
do not differ in any position, then the Lemma trivially holds
(∆H = 0). That is, without loss of generality, there exists j1
and j2 (with j1 6= j2) such that c
′
j1
= cj1+1 and c
′
j2
= cj2−1.
Also, n − 1 ≥ cj1 ≥ 0 which means that n ≥ c
′
j1
≥ 1, and
n ≥ cj2 ≥ 1 which means that n−1 ≥ c
′
j2
≥ 0. Furthermore
for i 6= j1, j2, we have c
′
i = ci, and also:
m∑
i=1
ci =
m∑
i=1
c′i = n .
Now:
H(z) = −
m∑
i=1
ci
n
log2
ci
n
= −
1
n
[
m∑
i=1
ci log2 ci − n log2 n
]
= log2 n−
1
n

cj1 log2 cj1 + cj2 log2 cj2 +∑
i6=j1,j2
ci log2 ci

 .
Similarly,
H(z′) = log2 n−
1
n
∑
i6=j1,j2
ci log2 ci
−
1
n
[(cj1 + 1) log2 (cj1 + 1) + (cj2 − 1) log2 (cj2 − 1)] .
We have that ∆H = maxcj1 ,cj2 |H(z)− H(z
′)|, but for
brevity we omit the max and analyze this quantity with
respect to the values of cj1 and cj2 to show that the lemma
holds in each case.
Observe that:
∆H =
∣∣H(z)−H(z′)∣∣
=
1
n
|cj1 log2 cj1 − (cj1 + 1) log2 (cj1 + 1)
+ cj2 log2 cj2 − (cj2 − 1) log2 (cj2 − 1)| .
• Case 1: cj1 = 0. We have
∆H =
1
n
|cj2 log2 cj2 − (cj2 − 1) log2 (cj2 − 1)| .
Clearly, if cj2 = 1 then ∆H = 0 and the Lemma triv-
ially holds. So assume cj2 > 1. We have:
∆H =
1
n
|cj2 log2 cj2 − (cj2 − 1) log2 (cj2 − 1)|
=
1
n
∣∣∣∣cj2 log2
(
cj2
cj2 − 1
)
+ log2 (cj2 − 1)
∣∣∣∣
≤
1
n
∣∣∣∣cj2 log2
(
cj2
cj2 − 1
)∣∣∣∣+ 1n log2 (cj2 − 1)
≤
1
n
log2 (n− 1) +
1
n
∣∣∣∣(a+ 1) log2
(
1 +
1
a
)∣∣∣∣ ,
where a = cj2 − 1 ≥ 1. It is easy to see that (a +
1) log2(1 +
1
a
) ≤ 2. We conclude that: ∆H ≤ 1n (2 +
log2 n).
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• Case 2: cj2 = 1. We have
∆H =
1
n
|cj1 log2 cj1 − (cj1 + 1) log2 (cj1 + 1)| .
Again if cj1 = 0, then the Lemma trivially holds. So
assume cj1 > 0. We have:
∆H =
1
n
|cj1 log2 cj1 − (cj1 + 1) log2 (cj1 + 1)|
=
1
n
∣∣∣∣cj1 log2 ( cj1cj1 + 1)− log2 (cj1 + 1)
∣∣∣∣
≤
log2 n
n
+
1
n
∣∣∣∣cj1 log2 ( cj1cj1 + 1)
∣∣∣∣
=
log2 n
n
+
1
n
cj1 log2 (
cj1 + 1
cj1
)
=
log2 n
n
+
1
n
cj1 log2
(
1 +
1
cj1
)
.
Using L’Hopital’s rule we have cj1 log2
(
1 + 1
cj1
)
≤ 1
ln 2
.
We conclude that: ∆H ≤ 1n (
1
ln 2
+ log2 n).
• Case 3: cj1 ≥ 1, cj2 ≥ 2. We have:
∆H =
1
n
|cj1 log2 cj1 − (cj1 + 1) log2 (cj1 + 1)
+ cj2 log2 cj2 − (cj2 − 1) log2 (cj2 − 1)|
≤
1
n
|cj1 log2 cj1 − (cj1 + 1) log2 (cj1 + 1)|
+
1
n
|cj2 log2 cj2 − (cj2 − 1) log2 (cj2 − 1)| ,
where it is seen that the two terms have been bounded
for cases 1 and 2. Thus, putting it all together, we
conclude that ∆H ≤ 1n
(
2 + 1
ln 2
+ 2 log2 n
)
.
C. PROOF: CONNECTION WITH DIFFER-
ENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 of Section 2.
Theorem 1 (Differential Privacy of F).
Let F denote Mechanism 1 with the (randomized) Privacy
Test 2 and parameters k ≥ 1, γ > 1, and ε0 > 0. For any
neighboring datasets D and D′ such that |D|, |D′| ≥ k, any
set of outcomes Y ⊆ U, and any integer 1 ≤ t < k, we have:
Pr{F(D′) ∈ Y } ≤ eεPr{F(D) ∈ Y }+ δ ,
for δ = e−ε0(k−t) and ε = ε0 + ln (1 +
γ
t
).
We start with some notation. Let U denote the universe of
data records. All data records, i.e., those from the datasets
D and D′, including synthetic records produced byM (and
F) are elements of U . Let D and D′ denote two neighboring
datasets, i.e., either D = D′ ∪ {d} for some d ∈ U , or D′ =
D ∪ {d′} for some d′ ∈ U . We assume that both D and D′
have at least k records, and we have parameters k ≥ 1, γ >
1, ε0 > 0. For convenience we write pd(y) = Pr{y =M(d)},
and refer to M only implicitly.
Given a dataset D⋆, we want to reason about the prob-
ability that synthetic record y is released: Pr{F(D⋆) = y}.
Observe that given synthetic record y ∈ U , the records of
D⋆ can be partitioned (into disjoint sets) by the privacy cri-
terion. Concretely, let Id(y) be the partition number of a
record d ∈ D⋆ with respect to y. The partition number Id(y)
is the unique non-negative integer such that γ−(Id(y)+1) <
pd(y) ≤ γ
−Id(y). In other words, Id(y) = ⌊− logγ pd(y)⌋. If
pd(y) = 0 then the partition number is undefined. Simi-
larly, we define the partition (or partition set) for i ≥ 0 as
Ci(D
⋆, y) = {d : d ∈ D⋆, Id(y) = i}. That is, partition i is
the set of records with partition number i.
A key step is to express the probability Pr{F(D⋆) = y}
in terms of: (1) the probability of generating y from a spe-
cific partition (i.e., the seed is in that partition) and (2)
the probability of passing the test. For (2) remark that the
probability of passing the privacy test depends only on the
partition of the seed (see Privacy Test 2).
Definition 3. For any dataset D⋆, if the seed is in parti-
tion i, the probability of passing the privacy test is given by:
pt(D⋆, i, y) = Pr{L ≥ k − |Ci(D
⋆, y)|}, where L ∼ Lap( 1
ε0
).
Definition 4. For any dataset D⋆, the probability of pro-
ducing y from partition i is:
q(D⋆, i, y) = pt(D⋆, i, y)
∑
s∈Ci(D
⋆,y)
ps(y) .
As the following demonstrates, Pr{F(D⋆) = y} is readily
expressed in terms of (1) and (2).
Lemma 2. For any dataset D⋆ and any synthetic record
y ∈ U we have:
Pr{F(D⋆) = y} =
1
|D⋆|
∑
i≥0
q(D⋆, i, y) . (15)
In other words, the probability of releasing y (from D⋆)
can be expressed as the sum, over all partitions, of the prob-
ability of generating y from a given partition and then re-
leasing it.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fixing a y and following the de-
scription of Mechanism 1, we have:
Pr{F(D⋆) = y} =
∑
s∈D⋆
Pr{s is seed,F(D⋆) = y}
=
1
|D⋆|
∑
s∈D⋆
ps(y) Pr{(D
⋆, s, y) passes test} ,
given the fact that the seed is sampled uniformly at random.
Further, observe that terms of the sum for which ps(y) = 0
can be omitted and that we can partition the set {d : d ∈
D⋆, pd(y) > 0} with respect to the partition number of its
elements. That is:
{d : d ∈ D⋆, pd(y) > 0} = ∪i≥0Ci(D
⋆, y) ,
where for each d ∈ D⋆ such that pd(y) > 0, there exists a
unique non-negative integer j such that d ∈ Cj(D
⋆, y).
14
Thus:
Pr{F(D⋆) = y}
=
1
|D⋆|
∑
s∈D⋆
ps(y) Pr{(D
⋆, s, y) passes test}
=
1
|D⋆|
∑
i≥0
∑
s∈Ci(D
⋆,y)
ps(y) Pr{(D
⋆, s, y) passes test}
=
1
|D⋆|
∑
i≥0
Pr{L ≥ k − |Ci(D
⋆, y)|}
∑
s∈Ci(D
⋆,y)
ps(y)
=
1
|D⋆|
∑
i≥0
pt(D⋆, i, y)
∑
s∈Ci(D
⋆,y)
ps(y)
=
1
|D⋆|
∑
i≥0
q(D⋆, i, y) ,
given that the privacy test depends only on the partition of
the seed (and not on the seed itself). (See the description
of Privacy Test 2 with L being drawn from Lap( 1
ε0
).)
Remark that q(D⋆, i, y) = 0 if and only if Ci(D
⋆, y) =
∅. Also, observe that if a record is added to or subtracted
from D⋆ then only one partition changes. As a result, we
can analyze case-by-case the change in the probability of
releasing y from partition i, when adding or removing a
record to partition i.
The following shows that adding a record to some parti-
tion only increases the probability of passing the privacy test
by at most eε0 . (This is a consequence of adding Laplacian
noise to the threshold.)
Lemma 3. Given any y ∈ U, any two neighboring datasets
D and D′ such that D′ = D ∪ {d′}. For any partition i we
have:
pt(D, i, y) ≤ pt(D′, i, y) ≤ eε0pt(D, i, y) .
To prove Lemma 3, we use the following observation (which
comes from the CDF of the Laplace distribution).
Observation 1. For any x ∈ R, if L is a Laplace random
variable with shape parameter b and mean 0, then we have:
Pr{L ≥ x} ≤ Pr{L ≥ x− 1} ≤ e
1
b Pr{L ≥ x} .
Proof of Lemma 3. There are two cases: i = Id′(y) or
i 6= Id′(y). If i = Id′(y) then d
′ falls into partition i and so
Ci(D
′, y) = Ci(D, y) ∪ {d
′}. We have:
pt(D′, i, y) = Pr{L ≥ k − |Ci(D
′, y)|}
≤ eε0Pr{L ≥ k − |Ci(D
′, y)|+ 1}
= eε0Pr{L ≥ k − |Ci(D, y)|} = e
ε0pt(D, i, y) ,
Also, we have that: pt(D′, i, y) > pt(D, i, y).
Otherwise, if i 6= Id′(y) then Ci(D
′, y) = Ci(D, y), and
so:
pt(D′, i, y) = Pr{L ≥ k − |Ci(D, y)|} = pt(D, i, y) .
Putting it together yields the result.
To quantify the change in q(D⋆, i, y) due to adding a
record to partition i we need to separate two cases: (1) the
partition is initially empty (or more generally has initially
less than t records) and (2) the partition is not empty (or
more generally has at least t records).
Lemma 4. For any y ∈ U and any dataset D. Let D′ =
D ∪ {d′} for some d′ ∈ U. Let j be the partition number of
d′ (i.e., Id(y) = j). The following holds.
(a) For all i 6= j, we have q(D′, i, y) = q(D, i, y).
(b) If |Cj(D, y)| < t:
q(D, j, y) < q(D′, j, y) ,
and
q(D′, j, y) ≤ e−ε0(k−t)
∑
s∈Cj(D
′,y)
ps(y) ≤ t e
−ε0(k−t) .
If |Cj(D, y)| ≥ t:
q(D′, j, y)
q(D, j, y)
≤ eε0
[
1 +
γ
t
]
.
Corollary 1 (of Lemma 4). For any y ∈ U and any
dataset D. Let D′ = D ∪ {d′} for some d′ ∈ U. We have
q(D, i, y) ≤ q(D′, i, y), for all i ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix y and let j be the partition
that d′ falls into.
For part (a), remark that for i 6= j, we have Ci(D, y) =
Ci(D
′, y). So q(D, i, y) = q(D′, i, y).
For part (b), we have that:
q(D, j, y) = pt(D, j, y)
∑
s∈Cj(D,y)
ps(y)
< pt(D, j, y)

 ∑
s∈Cj(D,y)
ps(y) + pd′(y)


= pt(D, j, y)
∑
s∈Cj(D
′,y)
ps(y)
≤ pt(D′, j, y)
∑
s∈Cj(D
′,y)
ps(y)
= q(D′, j, y) ,
given that pd′(y) > 0 and pt(D
′, j, y) ≥ pt(D, j, y) (Lemma 3).
Now, if |Cj(D, y)| < t, then:
q(D′, j, y) = pt(D′, j, y)
∑
s∈Cj(D
′,y)
ps(y)
≤ e−ε0(k−t)
∑
s∈Cj(D
′,y)
ps(y)
≤ t e−ε0(k−t) ,
given that |Cj(D
′, y)| ≤ t and pd(y) ≤ 1 for any d. Here,
the first inequality follows from the fact that pt(D′, j, y) =
Pr{L ≥ k − |Cj(D
′, y)|} ≤ Pr{L ≥ k − t} = 1
2
e−ε0(k−t).
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If |Cj(D, y)| ≥ t, we have:
q(D′, j, y) = pt(D′, j, y)
∑
s∈Cj(D
′,y)
ps(y)
= pt(D′, j, y) [
∑
s∈Cj(D,y)
ps(y) + pd′(y)]
≤ eε0 pt(D, j, y) [
∑
s∈Cj(D,y)
ps(y) + pd′(y)]
≤ eε0 [1 +
γ
t
] pt(D, j, y)
∑
s∈Cj(D,y)
ps(y)
= eε0 [1 +
γ
t
] q(D, j, y) ,
given Lemma 3 and the fact that pd′(y) ≤ γ ps(y) for any
s ∈ Cj(D, y) and so pd′(y) ≤
γ
t
∑
s∈Cj(D,y)
ps(y).
The following Lemma is the core result underlying Theo-
rem 1.
Lemma 5. Let F denote Mechanism 1 with the (ran-
domized) Privacy Test 2 and parameters k ≥ 1, γ > 1,
and ε0 > 0. Take any dataset D with |D| ≥ k and let
D′ = D∪{d′} for any d′ ∈ U. Then for any integer 1 ≤ t < k
and synthetic record y ∈ U, we have:
Pr{F(D) = y} ≤ eεPr{F(D′) = y} ,
and
Pr{F(D′) = y} ≤ eεPr{F(D) = y}+ δ ,
where δ = δ(D′, d′, y) ≤ e−ε0(k−t) and ε = ε0 + ln (1 +
γ
t
).
Here, δ(D′, d′, y) = e−ε0(k−t)|D′|−1
∑
s∈Cj(D
′,y) ps(y), with
j = Id′(y).
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix an arbitrary synthetic record
y ∈ U and an arbitrary dataset D with |D| ≥ k. Let D′ =
D∪{d′} for some arbitrary d′ ∈ U . Applying Lemma 2 to D
we have: Pr{F(D) = y} = 1
|D|
∑
i≥0 q(D, i, y). Also, from
Corollary 1 we have q(D, i, y) ≤ q(D′, i, y) for all i. Thus:
Pr{F(D) = y} =
1
|D|
∑
i≥0
q(D, i, y)
≤
1
|D|
∑
i≥0
q(D′, i, y)
=
|D′|
|D|
Pr{F(D′) = y}
≤
(
1 +
1
k
)
Pr{F(D′) = y} .
Observe that since (by assumption) γ > 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ k,
we have: 1
k
≤ 1
t
, and so 1 + 1
k
< 1 + γ
t
≤ eε0(1 + γ
t
) = eε.
This shows the first part.
For the second part, apply Lemma 2 to D′, and let j be
the partition number of d′, i.e., j = Id′(y). We have:
Pr{F(D′) = y} =
1
|D′|
∑
i≥0
q(D′, i, y)
=
1
|D′|

 ∑
i≥0:i6=j
q(D′, i, y) + q(D′, j, y)


=
1
|D′|
∑
i≥0:i6=j
q(D, i, y) +
q(D′, j, y)
|D′|
.
The last equality follows from Lemma 4 part (a).
Applying Lemma 4 part (b), we obtain two cases.
• Case 1: |Cj(D, y)| < t. We have:
Pr{F(D′) = y} =
1
|D′|
∑
i≥0:i6=j
q(D, i, y) +
q(D′, j, y)
|D′|
≤
1
|D′|
∑
i≥0:i6=j
q(D, i, y) + δ(D′, j, y)
≤
1
|D′|
∑
i≥0
q(D, i, y) + δ(D′, j, y)
=
|D|
|D′|
Pr{F(D) = y}+ δ(D′, j, y)
≤ Pr{F(D) = y}+ δ ,
where δ(D′, j, y) = 1
|D′|
e−ε0(k−t)
∑
s∈Cj(D
′,y) ps(y).
• Case 2: |Cj(D, y)| ≥ t. We have:
Pr{F(D′) = y}
=
1
|D′|

 ∑
i≥0:i6=j
q(D, i, y) + q(D′, j, y)


≤
1
|D′|

 ∑
i≥0:i6=j
q(D, i, y) + eε0 [1 +
γ
t
]q(D, j, y)


≤ eε0 [1 +
γ
t
]
1
|D′|
∑
i≥0
q(D, i, y)
= eε0 [1 +
γ
t
]
|D|
|D′|
Pr{F(D) = y}
≤ eεPr{F(D) = y} ,
for ε = ε0 + ln (1 +
γ
t
) given that |D|
|D′|
< 1.
Letting δ(D′, d′, y) = δ(D′, Id′(y), y) finishes the proof.
With this, we are in a position to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix dataset D with |D| ≥ k and
any record d′ ∈ U . Let D′ = D ∪ {d′}. The range of F is U
and so any outcome Y is a non-empty subset of U . Fix an
arbitrary Y ⊆ U with Y 6= ∅.
We will show that Pr{F (D1) ∈ Y } ≤ e
ε
Pr{F (D2) ∈ Y }+
δ, whether D1 = D and D2 = D
′, or D1 = D
′ and D2 = D.
Consider first the case D1 = D and D2 = D
′. Applying
Lemma 5, we obtain:
Pr{F(D) ∈ Y } =
∑
y∈Y
Pr{F(D) = y}
≤
∑
y∈Y
eεPr{F(D′) = y}
= eεPr{F(D′) ∈ Y } .
Now, consider the case D1 = D
′ and D2 = D. Define
c(d′, y) = |CId′ (y)(D, y)|. Given d
′, we can partition Y be-
tween those y ∈ Y such that the partition in which d′ falls
has at least t and those such that the partition has less than
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t. That is, Y = Yt− ∪ Yt+, with Yt− = {y : y ∈ Y, c(d
′, y) <
t} and Yt+ = {y : y ∈ Y, c(d
′, y) ≥ t}. We have:
Pr{F(D′) ∈ Y } =
∑
y∈Y
Pr{F(D′) = y}
≤
∑
y∈Yt+
eεPr{F(D) = y}
+
∑
y∈Yt−
[eεPr{F(D) = y}+ δ(D′, Id′(y), y)]
= eε
∑
y∈Y
Pr{F(D) = y}+
∑
y∈Yt−
δ(D′, d′, y)
= eεPr{F(D) ∈ Y }+
∑
y∈Yt−
δ(D′, d′, y) ,
where the inequality applies cases of Lemmas 4 and 5 sep-
arately to each y depending on whether y ∈ Yt− (case 1 in
the proof of Lemma 5) and y ∈ Yt+ (case 2 in the proof of
Lemma 5).
It remains to show that
∑
y∈Yt−
δ(D′, d′, y) ≤ e−ε0(k−t).
For this define C(D′, d′, y) = CId′ (y)(D
′, y). We have:
∑
y∈Yt−
δ(D′, d′, y) =
∑
y∈Yt−
e−ε0(k−t)
|D′|
∑
s∈C(D′,d′,y)
ps(y)
=
e−ε0(k−t)
|D′|
∑
s∈D′
∑
y∈Yt−
1Id′ (y)=Is(y)
ps(y)
≤ e−ε0(k−t) ,
given that
∑
y∈Yt−
1Id′ (y)=Is(y)
ps(y) ≤
∑
y∈U ps(y) ≤ 1 for
all s ∈ D′.
17
